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The Wyoming Uninsured Motorist Act requires automobile insurers
authorized to do business in Wyoming to offer a policy endorsement
which allows insureds to recover damages for bodily injuries caused
by negligent uninsured or hit-and-run drivers. In writing this coverage,
insurers typically add a variety of restrictions, exclusions, and conditions. The use of such devices is the subject of a recently promulgated
administrative regulation of the State Insurance Department. The author
explains the operative effect of the standard restrictive provisions found
in uninsured motorist endorsements, examines judicial reaction to them,
and details Wyoming's recent effort to reform the practices of the insurance industry in this area.

THE WYOMING UNINSURED MOTORIST
ACT: A REGULATORY RECONCILIATION
OF MANDATED COVERAGES WITH THE
STANDARD UNINSURED MOTORIST
ENDORSEMENT
Glenn E. Smith*

R

OUGHLY one out of every fifteen licensed Wyoming driv-

ers will be involved in an automobile accident this year,'
and when that accident occurs, the chances are approximately one in four that the driver will be struck by, or will
himself be, an uninsured motorist or a hit-and-run driver.'
Projections in 1975 indicate that the financially irresponsiCopyrightsc 1976 by the University of Wyoming

*Deputy Insurance Commissioner, State of Wyoming; B.A., J.D., University
of Wyoming.
1. According to statistics maintained by the Motor Vehicle Division of the Department of Revenue, there were approximotely 244,000 licensed Wyoming
drivers at year end 1974, and 14,814 reported accidents involving either
bodily injury or property damage in excess of $250. WYOMING TRAGIC
ACCIDENT FACTS, REPORT OF THE HIGHWAY SAFETY BRANCH TO THE WYO-

MING HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT 11 (1970).
2. The exact percentage of uninsured motorists in Wyoming is impossible to
determine by the statistical data kept by the Motor Vehicle Division of the
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ble motorist in Wyoming will somehow be involved in over
3700 accidents, resulting in some fifty deaths, 1350 injuries,
and a combined economic loss of over eleven million dollars.'
Part of this tremendous economic loss caused by automobile owners who carry no liability insurance has been absorbed in Wyoming by automobile insurance carriers who
must now conform to the provisions of the Wyoming Uninsured Motorist Act.4 Enacted in 1969 and modeled after
Department of Revenue and the Wyoming Highway Department. According to data furnished to the author, 10,727 Wyoming drivers were requested
to furnish proof of financial responsibility in 1974, and out of that number
8,784 SR-21 forms were received from insurance companies, leading one
to believe that approximately 82% of Wyoming's drivers are insured. This
computation, however, is distorted on the one hand by the observation that
uninsured drivers are perhaps more likely to cause accidents than insured
drivers, and on the other by the fact that many insurance companies send
in SR-21 forms when they are not required to do so (when property damage does not exceed $250, for example). This is corroborated by the fact
that in the month of November, 1974, the number of SR-21 forms received
by the Motor Vehicle Division exceeded the number of drivers involved in
accidents. Hence, the conclusion that 82% of Wyoming's drivers are insured
is probably an optimistic one. Letter from D. D. Cameron to George Beckman, Sept. 30, 1975, on file in the Wyoming Insurance Department.
The estimation that 25% of Wyoming's drivers are uninsured is consistent
with the percentage of uninsured drivers in neighboring states. A Department of Transportation study indicates that nationwide approximately 20%
of all motorists are uninsured. In the states with compulsory insurance
laws, such as Massachusetts, New York, and North Carolina, more than
ninety percent of all vehicles are insured. In seventeen other states, the
proportion of vehicles insured ranges from eighty to ninety percent. At the
other end of the scale, fourteen states have less than seventy-five percent
of their vehicles insured. At the extreme, one-third of all such vehicles in
Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, and Nevada do not have liability coverage.
INSURANCE ACCESSIBILITY FOR THE HARD-TO-PLACE DRIVER, REPORT OF THE
DIVISION OF INDUSTRY ANALYSIS, BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, FEDERAL TRADE

COMMISSION (U.S. Dept. Trans. Auto. Ins. & Comp. Study) 28 (1970).
3. WYOMING TRAFFIC ACCIDENT FACTS, supra note 1, at 3. These estimations
were arrived at by dividing the total deaths, accidents, injuries, and economic loss in the year 1974 by one-fourth.
4. WYO. STAT. § 31-315.1 (Supp. 1975).
No policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by
law for bodily injury or death suffered by any natural person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle
shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect
to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state
unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in limits
for bodily injury or death as set forth in section 31-278 (j), Wyoming Statutes 1957, Compiled 1967, as amended from time to time,
under provisions approved by the insurance commissioner, for the
protection of persons insured thereunder or legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death
resulting therefrom; provided, however, that the named insured
shall have the right to reject such coverages; and provided further
that unless the named insured requests such coverage in writing,
such coverage need not be provided in or supplemental to a renewal
policy where the named insured had rejected the coverage in connection with the policy previously issued to him by the same
insurer.
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similar legislation in forty-six other states,' the Wyoming
Act requires every insurer who is authorized to sell automobile liability insurance in the state to offer a coverage which,
as part of the insured's own policy, permits an innocent
victim of an accident caused by an uninsured motorist or a
hit-and-run driver to make claim against his own insurance
company for damages to which his injuries may entitle him.
The purpose of the Act is to put any insured party who is
injured by an uninsured motorist in the same position as he
would have been had the uninsured party carried the limits
of liability as prescribed by Wyoming's Safety Responsibility
Act.' Unless rejected by the insured in writing, it automatically becomes a part of every policy of automobile insurance issued in Wyoming.
There are at least three self-contained limitations which
the Uninsured Motorist Act places on the type of coverage
a policyholder is able to obtain from his insurance carrier.
First of all, the insured must prove that his injuries were
caused by the negligence of an uninsured motorist or hit-andrun driver, and if the insured contributes to his injuries by
his own negligence, the principles of comparative negligence
become fully applicable. 7 Secondly, uninsured motorist coverage applies to damages occasioned by bodily injury onlyit will not pay for property damage caused by the negligence
of an uninsured motorist. Finally, the coverage need only be
offered in limits prescribed by the state Safety Responsibility
Act, which means in most instances that the insured is covered for losses up to $10,000 per person and $20,000 per
occurrence!
Aside from these legislative limitations on uninsured
motorist coverages, policy draftsmen have grafted a number
of restrictive provisions, exclusions, and conditions of coverage onto the standard uninsured motorist endorsement,9 the
5. For statutory citations to the forty-six states which have enacted uninsured motorist statutes, see Graham, Recent Interpretations of the Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, 4 THE FORUM 160 n.1 (1969).
6. WYO. STAT. §§ 31-277 to -315 (1957).
7. WYO. STAT. § 1-7.2(a) (Supp. 1975).
8. WYO. STAT. § 31-278(j) (1957).
9. The standard uninsured motorist endorsement was formulated by the insurance industry in 1956 and was revised in 1963. Although a few companies
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purpose of which is to reduce the possibility of fraudulent
claims, the uncertainties that insurers face in offering the
coverage, and, quite obviously, the insurer's liability itself.
In so doing, however, the legislative objective of protecting
the policyholder and members of his family against the risk
of being negligently injured by a financially irresponsible
motorist has been partially defeated.1" The insured may find,
for example, that although he has purchased two different
policies of liability insurance from different insurers, both of
which contain uninsured motorist coverage and for which
separate premiums were paid, he will be permitted to collect on only one policy, even though his damages exceed the
combined limits of both.1 ' He may find that his insurer is
entitled to deduct from his uninsured motorist benefits all
sums paid by the insurer under another section of the policy
(medical payments, for instance), sums paid by a disability
carrier, or benefits collected from Workmen's Compensation." He may find that where his policy pays in full for
bodily injury damages caused when he was struck by a hitand-run motorist, it pays nothing if there was a fortuitous
lack of physical contact between the two vehicles.'" He may
likewise find that coverage is forfeited if he fails to report
the accident within twenty-four hours or if he fails to provide his insurer with a statement of oath, whether requested
or not, as provided in his insurance policy. 4 He may find
that he is precluded from initiating a lawsuit against his
insurer to recover uninsured motorist benefits because of a
mandatory arbitration clause, from which there is no right
of appeal." And he may find that if he obtains a judgment
from the uninsured motorist in a court of law without first
obtaining his insurer's consent to sue, that judgment will not

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

still append the endorsement to their policies in the form of supplemental
coverage, it is now contained in the body of most policies as part of the
insurance package. For a reprint of the standard uninsured motorist endorsement, see KEETON, INSURANCE LAW, app. H at 664 (1971).
KEETON, supra note 9, § 8.6(e) at 580.
See text accompanying notes 21 through 35 infra.
See text accompanying notes 36 through 41 infra.
See text accompanying notes 42 through 47 infra.
See text accompanying notes 67 through 73 infra.
See text accompanying notes 74 through 85 infra.
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be binding on the insurer, even though the insurer was given
notice of the suit and an opportunity to intervene.'"
With a suspicious eye cast toward any uninsured motorist policy provision which limits the liability of the
insurer or places an onerous burden on the insured, the restrictive provisions mentioned above have been judicially
voided in many states on the basis that they unlawfully restrict the minimum coverages required by state uninsured
motorist laws.' In spite of obvious judicial disfavor with the
standard uninsured motorist endorsement and the extraordinary amount of litigation it has spawned, the endorsement
has yet to be significantly modified by the insurance industry. s Even state insurance departments, statutorily charged
with the responsibility of approving policy forms, have shown
a strange reluctance to undertake meaningful reform.1" With
the objective of harmonizing uninsured motorist coverages
with the judicial interpretations they have received throughout the United States, the Wyoming State Insurance Department has recently promulgated an administrative regulation
which perhaps goes farther toward providing needed reform
in this particular area than actions taken in any other state.2
16. See text accompanying notes 86 through 94 infra.
17. SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE §§ 17.01 to 26.07 (1974).
18. Supra note 9. Although many of the restrictive policy provisions employed
in the standard uninsured motorist endorsement have been declared void
by a majority of courts which have passed on such issues, the endorsement
itself has remained unchanged since 1963. See SCHERMER, supra note 17,
§ 17.02 at 17-5.
19. A glance at any insurance company's uninsured motorist endorsement under
"State Exceptions" reveals that a sporadic number of state insurance departments have invalidated or required some change in select policy provisions. None, however, appear to have approached the problem on a comprehensive basis.
20. Regulation Governing Uninsured Motorist Endorsements, ch. XXIII, Wyoming Insurance Department Rules and Regulations (1975).
Section 1. Authority. These rules and regulations governing the policy
provisions employed in various uninsured motorist endorsements circulated within the State of Wyoming supplement Section 26.1-316(b)
of the Wyoming Insurance Code. They are promulgated by authority
of and pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act (Chapter 108, Session Laws of Wyoming, 1965) and to Sections 26.1-26 and
26.1-41 of the Wyoming Insurance Code.
Section 2. Purpose. The purpose of these rules is to assure that uninsured motorist coverages issued and circulated within the State of
Wyoming do not conflict with or otherwise unlawfully restrict the minimum coverages required by the Wyoming Uninsured Motorists Act.
Wyo. Stat. Section 31-315.1 (Supp. 1975). Further, their purpose is
to prevent the circulation of uninsured motorist policy forms in Wyoming which contain ambiguous, misleading, or inconsistent language
or which deceptively affect the risk purported to be assumed in the
general coverage of the contract.
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The purpose of this article will be to explain the operative effects of these restrictive policy provisions and their
purpose, to examine some of the cases which have passed on
the validity of such provisions, and to detail the changes
now required in the standard uninsured motorist endorsement by the regulation.
I. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY PROVISIONS

The standard uninsured motorist endorsement overflows
with policy provisions which have no other purpose but to
limit the liability of the insurer. Four of these provisions
will be discussed below.
Section 3. Applicability. These rules shall apply to any casualty insurer who circulates automobile liability insurance in the State of
Wyoming.
Section 4. "Other" insurance clauses. In all instances where the insured holds more than one policy of uninsured motorists insurance
or is entitled to recover under more than one policy of uninsured motorists insurance, for which separate premiums have been paid, the extent
of his coverage will be the combined coverages under all policies, and
actual damages sustained by the insured will be recoverable to the full
extent of the combined limits of all such policies. Such recovery, however, will not exceed the minimum requirements for coverage under
Section 31-278(j) Wyo. Stat. (Supp. 1975), as to all other policies except the primary policy. The primary policy shall be construed to
mean that policy which provides the coverage for the insured automobile involved in the accident.
Section 5. Reduction of uninsured motorists coverage by sums paid
under automobile medical coverage, bodily injury coverage, and Workmen's Compensation.
a. In no instance shall the benefits payable under uninsured motorists
coverage be reduced on account of payments made under any other
section of the policy, including, but not limited to, sums paid under
automobile medical coverage and bodily injury liability coverage,
where actual damages exceed the policy limits of the uninsured
motorists coverage. Only when total proven or undisputed damages
incurred by the insured do not exceed the policy limits of the uninsured motorists coverage may payments made under other provisions
of the policy be used to reduce uninsured motorist benefits.
b. In no instance shall the benefits payable under uninsured motorists
coverage be reduced by amounts paid under Workmen's Compensation legislation.
Section 6. Hit and run coverage.
a. In no instance shall uninsured motorist endorsements which provide
coverage against bodily injury inflicted by a hit and run motorist
restrict such coverage to injuries which result from actual physical
contact with the hit and run vehicle.
b. Any language which requires the insured to report a hit-and-run
accident to a police officer or the Department of Motor Vehicles
within 24 hours after the occurrence of the accident shall be amended to read "within 24 hours after the occurrence of the accident or
as soon thereafter as is practicable under the circumstances."
c. Any language which requires the insured to file with the insurer a
statement of oath within 30 days after the accident shall have been
reported shall be amended to read "and at the request of the insurer
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A. "Other" Insurance Clauses
Quite often a person who has suffered injuries as a result of an accident involving an uninsured motorist may
discover that he has been defined as an "insured party" under more than one policy of uninsured motorist insurance.
The most usual example of when this might occur is when a
person owning an automobile is injured while riding as a
guest passenger in a nonowned automobile. If this happens,
the injured person will be insured under the owned automobile coverages of his own policy 1 in addition to the coverage
he has under his host's policy,22 assuming that both host and
passenger have purchased uninsured motorist protection.
The insured may also have more than one policy available
to him for recovery if he has purchased different insurance
shall have filed a statement of oath within 30 days after the request
for same is made."
Section 7. Defining an uninsured automobile.
a. All uninsured motorist coverages must delete from policy forms circulated within the State of Wyoming any language which excludes
from the definition of an uninsured automobile any motor vehicle
owned by a state or local governmental agency and any federal vehicle where its use is unauthorized.
b. Any uninsured motorists coverage circulated within the State of
Wyoming which excludes from the definition of an uninsured automobile any land motor vehicle or trailer while located for use as a
residence or premises shall be amended to read "This exclusion shall
not apply to mobile recreational vehicles while being used for normal or ordinary purposes."
Section 8. Consent to sue clause. In no instance shall any uninsured
motorists coverage circulated within the State of Wyoming contain
any policy language which forbids the insured to prosecute an action
against an uninsured motorist without the written consent of the insurer. The insurer, however, shall be entitled to a copy of the complaint
and summons forthwith in the event the insured decides to initiate a
lawsuit.
Section 9. Mandatory arbitration clause. In no instance shall any uninsured motorists coverage circulated within the State of Wyoming
contain an [sic] mandatory arbitration clause by which the insured is
required to arbitrate an insurance claim in the event of disagreement
with his insurer, nor shall any such clause require that the results of
arbitration are binding on the parties without the right of appeal unless the parties themselves agree to be so bound by a separate agreement.
Section 10. Benefits in excess of actual damages not to be inferred.
Notwithstanding any other section of this regulation, no payments will
be required under uninsured motorists coverage which would result in
duplicate payment for the same elements of loss or payment in excess
of damages sustained.
21. KEETON, supra note 9. Under the standard uninsured motorist endorsement,
an "insured party" is defined to include "the named insured and any
relative."
22. KEETON, supra note 9. The standard uninsured motorist endorsement also
defines an "insured party" as including "any person while occupying an
insured automobile."
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policies for multiple-owned automobiles, and he is injured
while driving an owned vehicle, while riding in a nonowned
vehicle, or while crossing the street.23 Under any of these
examples, should the injured party find himself insured, say,
under three separate policies, each of which carries the minimum limits of $10,000 for bodily injury or death per person,
he may have a total of $30,000 available to him for compensatory purposes."'
Because of the additional exposure that this creates
for the insurer, most companies have attempted to prevent
the "stacking" of separate uninsured motorist policies by
incorporating provisions in the policy that limit the insured's
recovery to an amount that represents the single highest
limit of liability coverage under any one coverage. This has
been accomplished by two uniformly used policy provisions,
the "excess escape" clause 25 and the
commonly known as
"pro rata" clause. 6 Under the excess escape provision the
insurer effectively eliminates its liability if the insured incurs
an injury while occupying a nonowned automobile by declaring its insurance excess over the host's policy of insurance,
but only up to the limits of the primary policy. Thus, if an
As long as the insured suffers bodily injury at the hands of an uninsured
motorist and he is not driving or riding in an owned, uninsured vehicle,
he is covered under the standard uninsured motorist endorsement, regardless
of how he is injured. See text accompanying notes 48 through 53 infra.
24. A believable hypothetical could be constructed under which the insured has
more than three policies available to him for recovery. If he is a passenger
in a nonowned vehicle, and the driver has three separate policies of insurance
and he has three of his own, his potential recovery for provable damages
could be $60,000. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Christenson, 494
P.2d 552 (Nev. 1972), in which the plaintiff was allowed to recover $50,000
on five policies of uninsured motorist insurance.
25. KEETON, supra note 9. The "excess escape" clause reads as follows:
With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying an
automobile not owned by the named insured, the insurance under
Part IV shall apply only as excess insurance over any other similar insurance available to such insured and applicable to such automobile as primary insurance, and this insurance shall then apply
only in the amount by which the limit of liability for this coverage
exceeds the applicable limits of liability of such other insurance.
26. KEETON, supra note 9. The pro rata clause reads:
Except as provided in the foregoing paragraph [referring to the
excess escape clause], if the insured has other similar insurance
available to him and applicable to the accident, the damages shall
be deemed not to exceed the higher of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such other insurance, and the company
shall not be liable for a greater proportion of any loss to which
this Coverage applies than the limit of liability hereunder bears
to the sum of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance
and such other insurance.
23.
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insured is injured by an uninsured motorist while riding
with his neighbor to work, and he incurs $20,000 in injuries,
he may recover a maximum of $10,000 in benefits under his
host's policy, while he is precluded by the excess escape clause
from recovering anything under his own. The pro rata clause,
on the other hand, applies in any situation where there are
multiple coverages available to the insured other than where
he is a passenger in a nonowned vehicle. Under such coverages, the loss is then prorated among the different insurers
to a maximum of $10,000. If the insured, for instance, has
purchased two policies of insurance from different companies
and is struck by an uninsured motorist while crossing the
street, each insurer is obligated to pay a maximum of $5000,
even though the actual loss may greatly exceed $10,000.
Whether these "other" insurance clauses conflict with
state uninsured motorist statutes is a frequently litigated
question in insurance law. 7 In most decisions the issue seems
to be whether the insurer is required by such statutes to offer the prescribed limits of liability to the insured
in each of the issued policies.2 What appears now to be a
solid majority view is well-expressed in the Alabama decision
of Safeco Insurance Co. v. Jones.2 9 Interpreting a statute
almost identical to the one passed by the Wyoming Legislature, and after exhaustively surveying the law in other
jurisdictions, the court concludes:
We hold that our statute sets a minimum amount
for recovery, but it does not place a limit on the
27. For a listing of the case law see Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 551 (1969). Approximately thirty-five jurisdictions now have some case law on the validity of
other insurance clauses. As of 1972, an analysis of the case law by the
court in Blakeslee v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 388 Mich. 464, 201 N.W.2d
786, 789-90 (1972), led the court to conclude:
Though a matter of first impression with this court, several other
jurisdictions have considered the problem [of other insurance
clauses] in interpreting similar uninsured motorist statutes. The
cases are divided. There are 19 states plus one Federal case applying state law which disallow such limitations as contrary to the
statute. There are 8 states with a contrary doctrine but only 3 of
them are directly on point-in 3 there is no uninsured motorist
statute involved, in two the statute itself allows prorating. This
leaves a heavy preponderance in favor of disallowing such
limitations.
Since Blakeslee was decided, at least seven more states have joined the ranks
of the majority, with one or two others siding with the minority. For a
comprehensive listing of case law, see SCHERMER, supra note 9, at § 24.02.
28. SCHERMER, supra note 17, § 24.02.
29. 286 Ala. 606, 243 So.2d 736 (1970).
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total amount of recovery so long as that amount
does not exceed the amount of actual loss; that
where the loss exceeds the limits of one policy, the
insured may proceed under other available policies;
and that where the premiums have been paid for
uninsured motorist coverage, we cannot permit an
insurer to avoid its statutorily imposed liability by
its insertion into the policy of a liability limiting
clause which restricts the insured from receiving
that coverage for which the premium has been
paid."
An older, minority position holds that there is no conflict between other insurance clauses and uninsured motorist
statutes, on the basis that uninsured motorist laws are intended to protect an insured only to the extent that he would
have been protected had the uninsured motorist carried the
minimum limits required by the state's financial responsibility law."1 For many courts, however, this argument has
not been an impressive one. The case of Van Tassel v. Horace
Mann Insurance Co., 2 for example, holds that the insured
is not receiving what has been paid for if his recovery is
restricted to the applicable limits of only one policy:
It seems to us that, in spite of the attempt by the
insurer to limit its liability to one policy or to the
amount recoverable under one policy, the fact that
the legislature required an uninsured-motorist-provision in all policies, added to the fact that a premium has been collected in each of the policies involved, should result in the policyholder's receiving
what he paid for on each policy, up to the full
amount of his damages. It is true that such holding results in permissible recovery exceeding what
he would have received if the uninsured motorist
had been insured for the minimum amount required
under our Safety Responsibility Act. But if the
question must be resolved on the basis of who gets a
windfall, it seems more just that the insured who
30. Id. at 742.
31. Transportation Ins. Co. v. Wade, 106 Ariz. 269, 475 P.2d 253 (1970); Putnam v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 48 Il. 2d 71, 269 N.E.2d 97 (1971);
Burcham v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 255 Iowa 69, 121 N.W.2d 500 (1963);
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Howe, 106 N.H. 422, 213 A.2d 420 (1965); Keeble
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 342 F. Supp. 963 (E.D. Tenn. 1971) ; State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bafus, 77 Wash. 2d 720, 466 P.2d 159 (1970).
32. 207 N.W.2d 348, 351-52 (Minn. 1973).
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has paid a premium should get all he paid for rather
than that the insurer should escape liability for that
which it collected a premium. (emphasis added).
Under the very recently decided case of Ramsour v.
Grange Insurance Co.,3" Wyoming has joined the growing
roster of states which have voided the use of "other" insurance clauses in uninsured motorist endorsements. In Ramsour, the plaintiff was injured by an uninsured motorist
while driving a rented vehicle, and she sought to recover for
extensive injuries under her own policy of insurance as well
as the policy purchased by the rental agency. Reversing a
district court summary judgment in favor of the insurer,
Justice Raper, speaking for a unanimous court, held that
Wyoming's Uninsured Motorist Act requires the "stacking"
of separate uninsured motorist policies where the insured's
actual damages exceed the limits under any one policy. Basing the decision primarily on the language the legislature
used in adopting the Wyoming Act, the court states:
The statute states that every policy of insurance
that is issued shall be in the amount of the statutory minimum. It does not say that if there is more
that one policy covering the insured, that the maximum to be paid would be the minimum limit of one
policy. We cannot stretch, extend, enlarge nor
amend what the legislature has clearly said. 4
Taking cognizance of the case authority, both in Wyoming and in other jurisdictions which have interpreted statutes identical to the Wyoming Act, whereby other insurance
clauses have almost uniformly been voided as conflicting with
the mandatory provisions of state uninsured motorist statutes, the Wyoming Insurance Department, pursuant to regulation, has withdrawn its approval of all policies of uninsured
motorist insurance circulated within the state which contain
any liability-limiting provisions, the purpose of which is to
limit the insurer's liability to the maximum benefits available under one primary policy of insurance, without regard
to the number of policies available to the insured for recovery and without regard to actual damages sustained. Under
33. 541 P.2d 35 (Wyo. 1975).
34. Id. at 37-38.
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the regulation recently promulgated by the Department of
Insurance, the extent of the insured's recovery in all instances
where the insured is entitled to recover under more than one
policy of insurance, for which separate premiums have been
paid, will be the combined coverages under all such policies
not to exceed actual damages incurred. 5
B. Reduction of Uninsured Motorist Benefits for Payment
Made Under Automobile Medical Coverage
Section 5 (a) of the Insurance Department regulations
governing uninsured motorist endorsements provides:
In no instance shall the benefits payable under
uninsured motorists coverage be reduced on account
of payments under any other section of the policy,
including, but not limited to, sums paid under
automobile medical coverage and bodily injury
liability coverage where actual damages exceed
the policy limits of the uninsured motorists
coverage. Only when total proven or undisputed
damages incurred by the insured do not exceed the
policy limits of the uninsured motorists coverage
may payments made under other provisions of the
policy be used to reduce uninsured motorist benefits.
This provision was made necessary by another liabilitylimiting clause uniformly used in uninsured motorist endorsements which allows the insurer to reduce the payment
an insurer is obligated to make under the uninsured motorist
section of the policy by an amount already paid under the
medical payment provision in a different section of the
policy.3" The purpose of the clause is to avoid a double liability on the part of the insurer where the insured, for
example, collects his actual damages of $2000 under the medical payment provision of the policy, and then turns around
35. Supra note 20.
36. KEETON, supra note 9. Under the standard uninsured motorist endorsement
the medical payment reduction clause states that "The company shall not
be obligated to pay under this Coverage that part of the damages which
the insured may be entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an
uninsured automobile which represents expenses for medical services paid
or payable under Part II."
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and tries to collect the same damages again under his uninsured motorist coverage.3"
Where its purpose is to prevent a double recovery of
damages by the insured this particular provision serves a
sound and fundamental purpose. Clearly, the insured should
not be permitted to recover twice for the same damages.
This provision, however, is used for the less salutory purpose
of reducing an insured's recovery of actual damages when
such damages are in excess of the policy limits. That is to
say, where the insured evidences actual damages of $12,000,
under this clause the insurer can pay the insured the normal
maximum of $2000 under the medical payment provision, and
then deduct that sum from the $10,000 minimum coverage
under the uninsured motorist section of the policy, so that
the insured receives a total of $10,000 in damages ($8,000
in uninsured motorist benefits, $2000 in medical pay benefits), as opposed to the $12,000 he would ordinarily be entitled to. When used in this fashion, the rationale that a
medical payment reduction clause is needed to avoid a double
liability on the part of the insurer no longer applies. This
is made clear in Melson v. Illinois National Insurance Co.,"s
in which the court held that where actual damages exceed
the limits of liability, the insured should be able to collect
under both the medical payment and uninsured motorist
provisions:
The defendant has admitted that the plaintiff's
damages are in excess of $12,000.00 . . . . Since
the plaintiff has been compensated for $2,000.00
of medical expenses he still has remaining a minimum of $10,000.00 in damages which have not
been paid as medical expenses and are not payable
as such since he has already exhausted his medical
payment coverage. Therefore, regardless if the remaining $10,000.00 of his admitted damages is
regarded as medical expenses, lost wages, damages
for pain, suffering or for permanent disability, it
37. Lyon v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 25 Utah 2d 310, 480 P.2d
(1971) ; Wittig v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 300 F. Supp. 679 (N.D.
1969) ; Hutchinson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 312 N.Y.S.2d
(1970).
38. Melson v. Illinois Nat'1 Ins. Co., 1 Ill. App. 3d 1025, 274 N.E.2d 664,
(1971).
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is clear that double payment will not occur if the
limit of uninsured motorists coverage is paid.
It follows that double payment can exist, and that
therefore the deduction provision applies, only if
the total amount of proven or undisputed damages
does not exceed the total of uninsured motorists
coverage and medical expense coverage.
Again, there is some split of authority on the question
of conflict between the mandatory provisions of state uninsured motorist laws and the medical pay reduction clause,
with the majority view again favoring the position that such
clauses are inoperative.3" As one case notes, if the plaintiff
were able to contract for medical expense coverage in the
sum of $10,000 and had suffered medical expenses in excess
of this amount, the effect of the medical payment reduction
clause would be to completely eliminate the uninsured motorist clause."0 As yet another court has remarked, "A result
which concludes that as medical bills go up, uninsured motorist coverage goes down, clearly seems incongruous to the
intent of the Legislature and should not be tolerated.""
C. Reduction of Uninsured Motorist Coverage for Payment
Made Under Workmen's Compensation Legislation
In addition to preventing an insurer from deducting
sums paid under the medical payment provision of the policy
from uninsured motorist benefits, the regulations of the
Wyoming Insurance Department have also voided a similar
policy provision which allows the insurer to deduct any
amounts the insured may receive under Workmen's Compensation legislation from the insured's uninsured motorist recovery.4" Although much of the case law has invalidated
policy provisions to this effect on grounds that they reduce
39. For an analysis of the case law see Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d 1353 (1969). See
also SCHERMER, supra note 17, § 20.04; Plevin, Set-Off in Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 10 (1971).

40. Stephens v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 182 Neb. 562, 156 N.W.2d 133, 139 (1968).
41. Keyes v. Beneficial Ins. Co., 39 Mich. App. 450, 197 N.W.2d 907, 910 (1972).
42. KEETON, supra note 9. The Workmen's Compensation reduction clause under
the standard uninsured motorist endorsement reads "Any amount payable
under the terms of this Part because of bodily injury sustained in an accident by a person who is an insured under this Part shall be reduced by (2)
the amount paid and the present value of all amounts payable on account
of such bodily injury under any workmen's compensation law, disability
benefits law, or any similar law.
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benefits below the minimum required by uninsured motorist
statutes," there is another compelling reason in Wyoming
for looking unsympathetically upon a Workmen's Compensation reduction clause.
Under this state's Workmen's Compensation Act,44 the
State Treasurer is partially subrogated to any recovery obtained in a third party liability action (which includes an
uninsured motorist carrier), whether as a result of judgment, compromise, settlement, or release. 5 Where the insured collects damages from an insurance carrier after receiving a Workmen's Compensation award, the insured must
return a portion of his insurance proceeds back to the State
Treasurer. Under the Wyoming Act, he is allowed to deduct
a reasonable cost of recovery and to retain one-half of the
remainder. Of the balance remaining, up to one-half shall be
paid to the State Treasurer as a reimbursement for amounts
previously paid out of the Workmen's Compensation fund."
This means that if the insured is injured by an uninsured
motorist in a job-related accident and incurs bodily injury
damages to the extent of $10,000, not only can the insurer
deduct the insured's Workmen's Compensation benefits from
the $10,000 it is obligated to pay under the policy, but the
State Treasurer is partially subrogated to the amount remaining after the reduction is made, leaving the insured
with a recovery diminished to a point below actual damages
sustained. Thus, in the example above, if Workmen's Compensation benefits paid for $5,000 of the insured's $10,000
loss, and the insurer is entitled to deduct that sum from the
$10,000 it is legally obligated to pay, leaving $5,000 in uninsured motorist benefits, the State Treasurer is subrogated
to part of the $5,000 paid by the insurer. The effect of the
subrogation rights of the Workmen's Compensation fund,
coupled with the reduction clause in the insured's uninsured
motorist policy, is to leave the insured totally uncompensated
43.

Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. McMahon, 487 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972);
Aldroft v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 106 R.I. 311, 259 A.2d 408 (1969); Bartlett
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 294 N.E.2d 665 (Ohio 1972); State Farm Ins.
Co. v. Cahoon, 287 Ala. 462, 252 So. 2d 619 (1971); Sullivan v. John Doe,
495 P.2d 193 (Mont. 1972).
44. WYo. STAT. §§ 27-310 to -388 (Supp. 1975).
45. WYo. STAT. § 27-313(a) (Supp. 1975).
46. WYo. STAT. § 27-313(a) (i) (Supp. 1975).
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for a significant portion of his loss. By voiding the Workmen's Compensation reduction clause, the insured's uninsured motorist recovery is left unimpaired after the insured
reimburses the Workmen's Compensation fund in the proper
amount.
Note should be taken of some apparent friction between
Section 5 (b) and Section 10 of the Insurance Department
regulation. Section 10 states that no payments will be required under any uninsured motorist coverage which would
result in duplicate payment for the same elements of loss or
payment in excess of actual damages sustained, while Section
5 (b) allows the insured to recover damages under his uninsured motorist policy undiminished by whatever award he
receives from the Workmen's Compensation fund. These
two sections could be construed in such a manner so that the
insured could collect from his insurer only that sum which
represents the balance between his actual damages and Workmen's Compensation benefits."
D. Exclusion for Accidents Occurring While Using a Motor
Vehicle Owned by the Named Insured But Not Expressly
Covered Under the Policy
A policy provision which enjoys frequent use in uninsured motorist coverages is one which excludes coverage for
injuries suffered by a named insured while occupying an
automobile owned by the insured or a member of his family
but not specifically listed in the policy.4" Under this exclusion, if the insured is driving or riding in any automobile
owned by him or a member of the household which is not
named in the policy, or if he is struck by such an automobile,
coverage will be denied.
The general purpose of an exclusion of this nature is to
prevent a family that owns two motor vehicles from paying
47. It is not made clear under the regulation whether Section 10 is meant to
apply only to benefits collectible under a policy of uninsured motorist insurance or whether its application was intended to extend to collateral
benefits.
48. KEETON, supra note 9. Under the standard uninsured motorist endorsement,
this provision states "This policy does not apply under Part IV: (a) to
bodily injury to an insured while occupying an automobile (other than an
insured automobile) owned by the named insured or a relative, or through
being struck by such an automobile."
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insurance premiums on only one and collecting benefits for
injuries sustained while operating the other.49 Notwithstanding this rationale, a majority of recent decisions have held
such exclusions invalid on the grounds that they are repugnant to state uninsured motorist statutes.5 0 In Nygaard v.
State Farm Automobile Ins. Co.,5 the court observed:
Although two lines of authority have developed, by
now perhaps a majority of courts which have dealt
with the issue have held that the exclusion of coverage of an insured while occupying an owned vehicle
other than the insured vehicle is invalid. While
few of these decisions have relied on specific legislative history in holding the exclusion of coverage
invalid, they have generally agreed in finding the
exclusion offensive to the public policy of protection
embodied in the uninsured-motorist statutes. According to these opinions, a policy excluding uninsured-motorist coverage for the insured occupying
another owned vehicle is invalid because "it is not
the intent of the statute to limit coverage to an insured by specifying his location or the particular
vehicle he is occupying at the time of injury." (citations omitted).
Recent decisions emphasize that uninsured motorist protection should follow the insured wherever he goes, regardless
of his mode of transportation, as long as the injury is caused
by a motorist who is uninsured. Thus, in Elledge v. Warren,"
the court held:
There is no requirement in the statute that the
insured have any relation, at the time of the accident, with any vehicle he owns and that is insured
with the insurer. The uninsured motorists protection covers the insured and the family members
while riding in uninsured vehicles, while riding in
49. Rushing v. Allstate Ins. Co., 216 So. 2d 875 (La. App. 1968). SCHERMER,
supra note 17, § 21.02.
50. Boettner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 388 Mich. 482, 201 N.W.2d 975
(1972); Elledge v. Warren, 263 So. 2d 912 (La. App. 1972); State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Hinkel, 87 Nev. 478, 488 P.2d 1151 (1971) ; Hogan v.
Home Ins. Co., 194 S.E.2d 890 (S.C. 1973) ; Touchette v. Northwestern
Mut. Ins. Co., 80 Wash. 2d 327, 494 P.2d 479 (1972) ; Vantine v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1296 (N.D. Ind. 1971).
51. 221 N.W.2d 151, 156 (Minn. 1974).
52. Elledge v. Warren, supra note 50, at 918.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1976

17

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 11 [1976], Iss. 1, Art. 7

230

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XI

commercial vehicles, while pedestrians, or while
rocking on the front porch.
Similarly, the case of Chavez v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.53 holds that:
[T]he only limitations on protection are those specifically set out in the statute itself, i.e., that the
insured be legally entitled to recover damages and
that the negligent driver be uninsured.
The exclusion clause here is invalid because it is
not the intent of the statute to limit coverage for an
insured to a particular location or a particular
vehicle.
In spite of the cogent reasoning in this impressive array
of cases, the regulations of the Insurance Department have
not altered the uninsured motorist policy exclusion for injuries sustained by a named insured while occupying a vehicle owned by the insured but not specifically covered in
the policy. By voiding this exclusion, the insurer becomes
unreasonably exposed to a risk not contemplated by either
party when the policy was issued. If the insured, for example,
purchases a policy of insurance for one vehicle, while leaving two other vehicles and a motorcycle uninsured, and in the
rather exaggerated circumstance where all four vehicles
were being driven the same day by different members of the
family, the insurer would be exposed to four different risks,
even though only one policy of insurance was sold and only
one premium collected. Under these circumstances, the risk
exposure is not commensurate with the premium received.
The insurer, accordingly, should be entitled to limit its uninsured motorist coverage to only those vehicles which are
separately insured and for which separate premiums have
been paid.
II. HIT AND RUN COVERAGE
A. Physical Contact Requirement
In addition to providing coverage against the risk of
bodily injury negligently inflicted by an uninsured motorist,
53. 533 P.2d 100, 102-03 (N.M. 1975).
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the standard uninsured motorist endorsement also provides
protection against hit-and-run motorists whose identity cannot be subsequently ascertained." As to the hit-and-run protection, however, the vast majority of policies restrict coverage to damages which result from actual "physical contact"
with the hit-and-run vehicle."5
The purpose of requiring a physical contact between the
insured's vehicle and the hit-and-run vehicle as a condition
precedent to coverage under the standard uninsured motorist endorsement is to ensure that the accident did occur as
the claimant may say it did. 6 Through a requirement of
physical contact, the insurer is able to reduce the type of
fraudulent claims that may occur, for instance, where the
insured falls asleep while driving on a two-lane highway,
runs into an embankment, and then tries to collect for bodily
injury under his uninsured motorist endorsement by reporting the incident to his insurer the next day as an accident
caused by a drunken driver who negligently ran him off the
road.
In spite of the understandable attempts on the part of
insurers to reduce the possibility of fraud in cases involving
a hit-and-run vehicle, the injustices inherent in requiring
physical contact as a condition of recovery are obvious. By
insisting on some type of contact, the insurer can prevent a
recovery under circumstances where, for example, a bus
54. KEETON, supra note 9. Under the standard uninsured motorist endorsement,
an uninsured automobile is defined to include a hit-and-run automobile.
55. KEETON, supra note 9. The hit-and-run provision under the standard uninsured motorist endorsement reads as follows:
"hit and run automobile" means an automobile which causes bodily
injury to an insured arising out of physical contact of such automobile with the insured or with an automobile which the insured is
occupying at the time of the accident, provided: (a) there cannot
be ascertained the identity of either the operator or the owner of
such "hit-and-run automobile"; (b) the insured or someone on his
behalf shall have reported the accident to the police, peace or judicial officer or to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, and shall
have with the Company within 30 days thereafter a statement
under oath that the insured or his legal representative has a cause
or causes of action arising out of such accident for damages against
a person or persons whose identity is unascertainable, and setting
forth the facts in support thereof; and (c) at the company's rerequest, the insured or his legal representative makes available
for inspection the automobile which the insured was occupying
at the time of the accident.
56. Brown v. Progressive Mut. Ins. Co., 249 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1971). ScimERMER,
supra note 17, § 23.02.
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passenger is injured when his bus suddenly stops to avoid
hitting a car that swerves in front of it, even though an
entire busload of passengers can corroborate the insured's
claim,5" or where a freight truck driving down the middle of
a narrow road at a high rate of speed runs a passenger car
into the ditch, causing the driver and his passengers to overturn." These are the type of factual situations, both of which
resulted in a dismissal of the insured's claim, that have inspired several commentators to conclude that an innocent
victim of a hit-and-run vehicle is much better off under his
policy of insurance to intentionally make physical contact,
where he has that choice, with the guilty party." One such
author has stated:
It is indeed unfortunate that an otherwise deserving insured who was injured in an effort to avoid
a more serious accident may be denied recovery under the physical contact clause; but until some better clause can be devised, it appears preferable for
the insured to collide rather than avoid where he
himself may be injured by avoiding."
As may be expected, the validity of the physical contact requirement has been litigated often in recent years. In spite
of several early decisions which held that such a requirement
constitutes a contractually permissible attempt to prevent
fraud on the insurer, 1 most of the recent decisions have concluded that the mere lack of physical contact should not prove
fatal to an otherwise legitimate claim, as long as the insured
57.
58.
59.

60.

61.

Collins v. New Orleans Pub. Serv. Inc., 234 So. 2d 270 (La. App. 1970).
Amidzich v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 44 Wis. 2d 45, 170 N.W.2d 813 (1969).
Notman, Uninsured Motorist Coverage: A Current Analysis, 55 ILL. B. J.
142, 147 (1966).
An alert, athletic pedestrian who barely manages to avoid contact
with such a car by leaping through a plate glass display window
receives the unkindest cuts of all for his efforts, but cannot qualify.
Snubbed, too, is the driver who miraculously manages to steer his
car off the highway and thus avoid a collision with an oncoming
vehicle traveling in the wrong lane, but in so doing effects a rather
abrubt stop against an unyielding bridge abutment. Seemingly,
then, this requirement once again illustrates vividly the bitter
truth of that time-worn pronouncement that "close ones only count
in horseshoes."
PRETZEL, UNINSURED MOTORISTS § 24.3A at 57-58 (1972).
Inter-Insurance Exch. v. Lopez, 238 Cal. App. 441, 47 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1965);
Lawrence v. Beneficial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 8 Ariz. App. 155, 444 P.2d 446
(1968); Prosk v. Allstate Ins. Co., 82 Ill. App. 2d 457, 226 N.E.2d 498
(1967).
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can sustain his burden of proof by showing that he in fact
was injured by a hit-and-run driver.12 This is well-expressed
in the leading decision of Brown v. Progressive Mutual Insurance Co. :"
The only reason for [the physical contact requirement] ... is to prove that the accident actually did
occur as a claimant may say it did. This is a question of fact to be determined by the jury, or the
judge if demand for jury trial is not made. If the
injured party can sustain the burden of proof that
an accident did occur, he should be entitled to recover, regardless of the actuality of physical contact. If twenty witnesses will swear they saw the
accident happen, their testimony should not be
deemed worthless, as it would be under the decision
here for review.
Other decisions have held that the physical contact requirement is fundamentally incongruous with the purpose
and intent of state uninsured motorist laws, on the basis that
the legislature could not have intended to protect one class
of motorists who establish contact while totally ignoring
those who do not."4 In Webb v. United Services Automobile
Ass'n,"5 the court voided the requirement of physical contact
on grounds of public policy by holding that:
If the legislature intended to "provide protection
to innocent victims of irresponsible drivers" it could
not also intend that the motorist faced with the
decision whether to collide with another vehicle or
to avoid it should choose to collide or else lose his
protection. (citations omitted).
The regulations of the Wyoming Insurance Department
are in accord with the position that the physical contact requirement constitutes an impermissible restriction upon the
broad coverage required under state uninsured motorist
62.

Brown v. Progressive Mut. Ins. Co., supra note 56; Webb v. United Serv.
Auto. Ass'n, 227 P. Super. 508, 323 A.2d 737 (1974) ; Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co. v. Novak, 83 Wash. 2d 576, 520 P.2d 1368 (1974); DeMello v.
Fire Ins. Co., 523 P.2d 304 (Hawaii 1974) ; Farmers Ins. Exch. v.
McDermott, 527 P.2d 918 (Colo. App. 1974).
63. Brown v. Progressive Mut. Ins. Co., supra note 56.
64. See cases cited, supra note 62.
65. Webb v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, supra note 62.
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laws." The automatic exclusion of all claimants injured by
hit-and-run drivers on the basis that their injuries were not
a result of physical contact is unnecessary and unwarranted,
as long as the claimant can prove to the satisfaction of a jury
that there was indeed another car involved. While this task
is certainly easier when there is contact, it should not be made
impossible simply because there was not.
B. Time Within Which Accident Must Be Reported
Most uninsured motorist endorsements contain a provision which requires hit-and-run accidents to be reported
to the police within twenty-four hours after the accident
occurs. 7 If the accident goes unreported, or is reported after
twenty-four hours have elapsed, coverage under the policy
may be forfeited."8
Wyoming law requires all accidents involving bodily injury to be reported to the proper authorities."9 In some instances, however, a twenty-four hour policy limitation for
reporting a hit-and-run accident can be an unreasonably
short one. In a rural state such as Wyoming, with approximately four people per square mile, it is not at all inconceivable that an insured could be killed or injured by a hit-andrun motorist on a remote secondary road, with no one discovering the accident until the following day. Under these
circumstances, the insured may lose his right of recovery
under the policy because it was not possible for the accident
to be reported within the specified time. In recognition of
this fact, the uninsured motorist regulations of the Department of Insurance now require all hit-and-run accidents to
be reported to the proper authorities within twenty-four
hours, or as soon thereafter as is practicable under the
circumstances."
66. Supra note 20, § 6(a).
67. Supra note 55.
68. An insured may recover if he was interviewed by police officers at the
scene of the accident, Long Island Ins. Co. v. Spaulding, 252 So. 2d 849
(Fla. App. 1971), and absence of observable property damage and lack
of apparent physical injury will excuse the reporting requirement. Mangus
v. Doe, 203 Va. 518, 125 S.E.2d 166 (1962).
69. WYO. STAT. § 31-288 (Supp. 1975).
70. Supra note 20, § 6(b).
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C. Statement of Oath
In addition to the physical contact requirement and the
time limitation imposed on the reporting of hit-and-run accidents, the standard uninsured motorist endorsement also
requires the insured to file with the insurer a statement
under oath that the insured has a legitimate cause of action
arising out of a hit-and-run accident.71 Most policies require
this statement to be submitted within thirty days from the
time the accident occurs.
Because prospective claimants all too often fail to read
their insurance policies to ascertain the affirmative steps
which must be followed to successfully prosecute a claim,
some jurisdictions have voided statement of oath provisions
in uninsured motorist policies on grounds that they impose
an unreasonable requirement on claimants, and hence are
violative of public policy.72 The Wyoming regulations, however, recognizing that fraudulent claimants will not be quite
so inclined to pursue illegitimate claims if they have to perjure themselves to do so, have not voided the statement of
oath provision altogether. Rather, they shift the burden of
securing the statement onto the insurer, so that now the insured's unfamiliarity with his own policy of insurance can
no longer be used as a policy defense after a claim has been
made.7"
III. ARBITRATION AND CONSENT TO SUE

A. Mandatory Arbitration Clause
Under the standard uninsured motorist endorsement,
the insurer can compel the arbitration of a disputed claim
between the insurer and the policyholder.7" The arbitration
71. Supra note 55.
72. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sours, 205 Va. 602, 139 S.E.2d 51 (1964);
Latham v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 482 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Civ. App.
1972).
73. Supra note 20, § 6(c).
74. KEETON, supra note 9. The standard uninsured motorist endorsement arbitration clause reads as follows:
If any person making claim hereunder and the company do not
agree that such person is legally entitled to recover damages from
the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily
injury to the insured, or do not agree as to the amount of payment
which may be owing under this Part, then, upon written demand
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result then becomes binding, with no right of appeal. Although for obvious reasons most insurance companies dislike
risking a jury determination on the questions of liability and
damages, and arbitration is often cited as a means of providing a quick and inexpensive forum for the settlement of
claims,7" the real purpose of the mandatory arbitration clause
is to protect the insurer against multiple lawsuits, in which
the interests of the insurer may be adversely affected through
the doctrine of collateral estoppel."8 For this reason, a provision for compulsory arbitration is frequently coupled with
a provision prohibiting suit or settlement by the insurer with
the negligent motorist, leaving arbitration with the insurer
as the only means by which the insured can enforce his rights
under his uninsured motorist coverage.77
The mandatory arbitration clause has been termed the
most controversial provision in the entire uninsured motorist endorsement,"8 and, ironically, it has been its own prolific
source of litigation. 9 A substantial number of states have
prohibitory arbitration statutes and common law decisions
which invalidate agreements to arbitrate future disputes as
a matter of public policy." Additionally, several uninsured
motorist statutes specifically prohibit mandatory arbitration, and some state insurance departments have voided such
provisions under their authority to disapprove policy forms."'
The regulations adopted by the Wyoming Insurance Department follow a similar pattern, although they do not prohibit
arbitration if both parties are willing to pursue that mechan-

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

81.

of either, the matter or matters upon which such person and the
Company do not agree shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association, and
judgment upon the award rendered by the arbitrators may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. Such person and
the company each agree to consider itself bound and to be bound
by any award made by the arbitrators pursuant to this Part.
SCHERMER, supra note 17, § 26.01; KEETON, supra note 9, § 7.3(c).
Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d 1325, 1328 (1969).
Infra note 86.
KEETON, supra note 9, § 7.3(c).
Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d 1325 (1969).
One author concludes that in thirty-one states the standard arbitration
clause "does not satisfy the statutory requirements for an agreement or
contract to arbitrate a future dispute." Widiss, Perspectives On Uninsured
Motorist Coverages, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 497, 531 (1967).
SCHERMER, supra note 17, § 26.02.
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ism as a means of resolving their dispute. Section 9 of the
regulation provides:
In no instance shall any uninsured motorists coverage circulated within the State of Wyoming contain
an [sic] mandatory arbitration clause by which the
insured is required to arbitrate an insurance claim
in the event of disagreement with his insurer, nor
shall any such clause require that the results of
arbitration are binding on the parties without the
right of appeal unless the parties themselves agree
to be so bound by a separate agreement.
Although both are prohibited by regulation, the distinction should nonetheless be drawn between mandatory and
binding arbitration. Binding arbitration is conspicuously
unconstitutional under Article 5, Section 28 of the Wyoming
Constitution, which states that "Appeals from decisions of
compulsory boards of arbitration shall be allowed to the
supreme court of the state, and the manner of taking such
appeals shall be prescribed by law." Mandatory arbitration,
on the other hand, is generally viewed with hostility, not on
constitutional grounds, but on convincing grounds of public
policy. Reasons frequently given for voiding arbitration
clauses include the arguments that (1) they infringe on the
right of a claimant to have free access to the courts;82 (2)
such provisions, contained in an intricate, complicated, and
adhesive contract of insurance, are not properly bargained
for by the insured, who is in no position to dictate the terms
of such a policy;8" (3) to enforce such a provision against
the injured party would be to permit the insurer to enforce
its rights as to arbitration by court proceedings while denying an equal opportunity to the insured party; and (4) uninsured motorist coverages provide that the insured "shall
be legally entitled to recover," implying that the amount
plaintiff may recover should be determined by the processes
of law.8"
Strangely enough, the mandatory arbitration clause appears in no other section of a standard automobile policy.
82.
83.
84.
wi.

Boughton v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 854 P.2d 1085 (Okla. 1960).
Barnhart v. Civil Serv. Emp. Ins. Co., 16 Utah 2d 233, 398 P.2d 873 (1965).
Id.
Id.
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That it was incorporated into the uninsured motorist endorsement alone can only be viewed as another attempt by
policy draftsmen to limit the method, and perhaps the amount,
of recovery by a policyholder who is injured by an uninsured
motorist.
B. Consent to Sue Clause
As mentioned above, insurers are reluctant to put themselves in a position where they are bound by the results of
an action brought by an insured against an uninsured motorist who is either irresponsible enough to permit the entry of a
default judgment against him or financially unable to provide an adequate defense. Consequently, to prevent the insured from determining the issues of liability and damages
in this manner, a consent to sue clause has been devised,"5 the
purpose of which is to preclude coverage under the uninsured
motorist endorsement if the insured prosecutes an action to
judgment against the uninsured motorist without the written
consent of the insurer.
The position taken by the regulations of the Insurance
Department is that where mandatory arbitration is unenforceable, the consent to sue clause itself becomes unenforceable."' If the insurer is no longer able to bar a claimant's
access to the courts by invoking its option to arbitrate the
question of liability, the insurer should not be able to accomplish the same result by being permitted to arbitrarily withhold its consent to sue. This is in accord with the holding of
Dominici v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,"
where the court, in speaking of the consent to sue clause as a
"no judgment" clause, concludes:
[A]s we read this contract we note that the question
of this type of arbitration is inexorably tied to the
86. KEETON, supra note 9. Under the standard uninsured motorist endorsement,
the consent to sue provision states:
No judgment against any person or organization alleged to be
legally responsible for the bodily injury shall be conclusive, as between the insured and the company of the issues of liability of such
person or organization or of the amount of damages to which the
insured is legally entitled unless such judgment is entered pursuant
to an action prosecuted by the insured with the written consent of
the company.
87. SCHERMER, supra note 17, § 26.02.
88. 143 Mont. 406, 390 P.2d 806, 809 (1964).
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"no judgment" clause. They complement one
another to the point one cannot exist without the
other. Where such arbitration is allowed and countenanced there is nothing unreasonable about the
latter mentioned clause .... But where contracts to
arbitrate future controversies are not enforceable a
"no judgment" clause, as exists before us, necessarily becomes unreasonable and itself must fall ....
By voiding the consent to sue clause, the Department
regulations do not deprive the insurer of its right to be notified of an action commenced against an uninsured motorist
by the insured." Notwithstanding the validity of the consent
to sue clause itself, upon which there is a familiar split of
authority, 0 the cases appear to be uniform in holding that
if the insurer is in fact notified of an action between the insured and the uninsured motorist, and does not choose to intervene after being notified, it cannot later be heard to contest the judgment on the basis that the policy required the
written consent of the insurer for such a judgment to be obtained before it is considered binding on the insured. As one
case stated, it would place the insured in "an absurd position
legally" to say that a judgment is not binding on the insurer
because, although notified of the action, the insurer did not
give written authorization to the insured to pursue the
judgment.9
Mention should be made that, in spite of case authority
to the contrary,92 the Department regulations leave intact a
corollary clause found in most uninsured motorist coverages
which prevents a settlement between the insured and the
uninsured motorist from becoming binding on the insurer
89. Supra note 20. Section 8 of the regulation provides that the insurer shall
be entitled to a copy of the complaint and summons forthwith in the event
the insured decides to initiate a lawsuit.
90. Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 1275 (1969).
91. Clayton v. Alliance Mut. Cas. Co., 212 Kan. 640, 512 P.2d 507, 514 (1973).
92. Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co., 538 P.2d 865 (Wash. App. 1975); Michigan
Mut. Liab. Co. v. Karsten, 13 Mich. App. 46, 163 N.W.2d 670 (1968);
Guthrie v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 279 F. Supp. 837 (D.C. Va.
1968); Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Clem, 49 Ala. App.
457, 273 So. 2d 218 (1973).
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against its will.9" The different treatment accorded this
"4consent to settle" clause is apparently justified on the premise that an indifferent or irresponsible uninsured motorist
can unduly prejudice the rights of the insurer by admitting
liability and obtaining a written release to protect his driving privileges.94 If the insured was allowed to bind his insurer by obtaining a settlement with the uninsured motorist
without consent, the insurer would have little protection in
doubtful cases of liability.
IV.

CONCLUSION

With the stated objective of assuring that uninsured
motorist coverages issued and circulated within the State
of Wyoming "do not conflict with or otherwise unlawfully
restrict the minimum coverages required by the Uninsured
Motorist Act" and to "prevent the circulation of uninsured
motorist policy forms in Wyoming which contain ambiguous,
misleading, or inconsistent language, or which deceptively
affect the risk purported to be assumed in the general coverage of the contract" 5 the Wyoming Insurance Department
has promulgated an administrative regulation which goes a
long way toward reconciling the type of coverage contemplated by state uninsured motorist statutes with the standard
uninsured motorist endorsement currently used by the insurance industry. By prohibiting the use of "other" insurance clauses, medical payment reduction clauses, Workmen's
Compensation reduction clauses, the physical contact requirement, compulsory arbitration clauses, and consent to sue
clauses, the regulation hopefully brings the uninsured motorist endorsement in Wyoming closer to the legislative objective of protecting the insured and members of his family
against the risk of being negligently injured by a financially
93. KEETON, supra note 9. This exclusion provides as follows:
This policy does not apply under Part IV (b) to bodily injury to
an insured with respect to which such insured, his legal representative or any person entitled to payment under this coverage shall,
without written consent of the company, make any settlement with
any person or organization who may be legally liable therefor.
94. SCHaMER, supra note 17, § 25.01. Under the Wyoming Safety Responsibility Act, an uninsured motorist who procures a written release from the
other party involved in the accident is able to reinstate his driving privileges. WYO. STAT. § 31-291 (1957).
95. Supra note 20, § 2.
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irresponsible motorist. No less important, the regulation
simplifies uninsured motorist coverages by making policy
provisions which have troubled the courts for years a bit
easier for the policyholder to understand.
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